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有限管制下快递包装逆向物流三方博弈行为分析
更新日期:2021-06-08     浏览次数:125
核心提示:摘要我国正逐步推行快递包装回收、垃圾分类等系列举措,但面临着快递包装回收成本高、消费者参与意愿低等一系列矛盾和问题。从演化博弈的视角,构建电商

摘要 我国正逐步推行快递包装回收、垃圾分类等系列举措,但面临着快递包装回收成本高、消费者参与意愿低等一系列矛盾和问题。从演化博弈的视角,构建"电商企业—消费者—政府"三者之间的博弈模型,分析政府管制措施对快递包装回收产业的影响,并以商业软件进行数值仿真分析。研究表明:产业处于发展初期阶段时,政府须保持一定的基础设施投入和财政补贴投入,增加企业实施回收的净收益,如以税收优惠等措施激励电商企业实施逆向物流,同时政府可通过回收计划积分奖励等调动消费者参与积极性;对财政补贴的实施给予适度的监管强度,过高的监管强度会抑制各方快递包装回收积极性,但低监管强度不利于回收产业的市场秩序建立与发展;政府对于不实施逆向物流的电商企业处罚力度大,有助于推动其向实施逆向物流的方向演化;消费者对于电商企业的态度,如不实施逆向物流的不满意度,可影响其市场份额,并促使其开展快递包装逆向物流。 Express packaging recycling is critical for solving the problem of low recycling rate of resources and serious environmental pollution. It entailed a tripartite game model between"ecommerce enterprise-consumer-government" from the perspective of evolutionary analysis. The research shows that:in the early stage,the government can invest on infrastructures and provide financial subsidy,such as using tax incentives for e-commerce enterprises to implement reverse logistics. On the other hand,the government can initiate some rewards programs to encourage consumers in recycling. Moderate supervision promotes courier packaging recycling. The greater the government′s penalties for e-commerce companies not implementing reverse logistics,the more favorable it is to promote the evolution of e-commerce enterprises towards the implementation of reverse logistics. Consumers impact on the market share of enterprises and therefore could promote reverse logistics on their packaging.
作者 何海龙 李明琨 HE Hailong;LI Mingkun(School of Management,Shanghai Univerisity,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处 《工业工程与管理》 北大核心 2021年第1期157-164,共8页 Industrial Engineering and Management
基金 国家哲学社会科学基金项目(16BGL083) 国家自然科学基金项目(71831008)。
关键词 政府管制 快递包装 逆向物流 演化博弈 government regulation express packaging reverse logistics evolutionary game